

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-13 ISO-00 ERDA-05 AF-10 ARA-10

CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-07 PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03

NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01

PRS-01 OES-07 SS-15 USIA-06 DLOS-09 NRC-05 /147 W

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R 011436Z JUL 77

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8784

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 GENEVA 5371

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM CCD

SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES ON MULTILATERAL  
ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

1. SUMMARY: AT URGING OF SOVIET AMB ISSRAELIAN, AMB SLOSS AND US  
DEL TO SEABED TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE MET WITH AMB ISSRAELIAN AND  
HIS COLLEAGUES FOR WIDE RANGING DISCUSSION OF MULTILATERAL ARMS  
CONTROL ISSUES. AMONG TOPICS COVERED WERE MBFR (REPORTED SEPTTEL),  
CTB, CW, MDW, SUMMER SESSION OF THE CCD, UN SPECIAL SESSION ON  
DISARMAMENT WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, AND THE TREATY OF  
TLATELOLCO. END SUMMARY.

2. BACKGROUND. DURING COURSE OF SEABED TREATY REVIEW CONFERENCE,  
SOVIET AMB ISSRAELIAN SEVERAL TIMES SUGGESTED TO US AMB SLOSS THAT  
REPS OF THE TWO GOVERNMENTS TAKE ADVANTAGE OF THEIR PRESENCE IN  
GENEVA FOR INFORMAL DISCUSSION OF RANGE OF MULTILATERAL ARMS  
CONTROL ISSUES. MEETING WAS HELD AT US MISSION IN GENEVA, JUNE 30  
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AND LASTED TWO HOURS. US PARTICIPANTS WERE SLOSS, TURRENTINE,  
THOMPSON AND WALDROP FROM SEABED DEL. SOVIET REPS WERE AMB ISSRAELIAN  
,  
STASHEVSKY, NARZARKIN AND SMIDOWITCH.

3. SLOSS INDICATED THAT THE THREE MAIN ISSUES BEFORE THE CCD ARE:  
A. COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN (CTB);

B. CHEMICAL WEAPONS LIMITATION (CW); AND NEW MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS (MDW).

WITH RESPECT TO THE FIRST TWO ISSUES, HE SAID THAT PROGRESS IN THE CCD IS DEPENDENT ON THE PROGRESS WE CAN MAKE IN THE CTB TRILATERAL (US, UK, USSR) AND CW BILATERAL (US, USSR) WORKING GROUPS.

4. CTB: SLOSS OBSERVED THAT THE MAIN DIFFERENCES IN THE US AND SOVIET POSITIONS ON CTB RELATE TO PNE'S AND VERIFICATION, AND NOTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN MOVEMENT IN THE SOVIET POSITION ON VERIFICATION AT THE UN LAST FALL. ISSRAELIAN RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD COME FORWARD WITH THE VERIFICATION FORMULA THAT THEY PRESENTED AT THE 31ST UNGA LAST FALL IN AN ATTEMPT TO MEET SOME OF THE WESTERN CONCERNS, AND IN THIS REGARD ALSO NOTED THAT SOVIETS HAD JOINED SEISMIC EXPERTS GROUP. HE SAID THAT HE HAD NEVER THOUGHT THAT VERIFICATION WAS A REAL DIFFICULTY, AND THAT WITH "GOOD WILL" IT COULD BE RESOLVED. WITH RESPECT TO PARTICIPATION, ISSRAELIAN CONFIRMED THAT SOVIETS ARE READY TO "GO ALONG AT THE OUTSET WITHOUT THE FRENCH AND THE CHINESE", BUT NOTED THAT THIS POSITION HAS NOT YET BEEN REVEALED TO CCD. HE SAID THAT HE WAS SURPRISED THAT THE US HAD RAISED A NEW PROBLEM WITH RESPECT TO PNE'S, SINCE PNE TREATY CLEARLY "PROVIDES FOR PNE'S".

5. SLOSS RESPONDED THAT HE WAS SURPRISED THAT ISSRAELIAN WAS SURPRISED ON PNE ISSUE SINCE DURING NEGOTIATION OF PNE TREATY IT WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED THAT THERE WAS NO WAY FOR AN OUTSIDE CONFIDENTIAL

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OBSERVER TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THE EXPLOSION OF A PNE DEVICE AND A NUCLEAR WEAPON. THE SOVIET SIDE RESPONDED THAT NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS WOULD TAKE PLACE ONLY AT NUCLEAR WEAPON TEST SITES WHICH MADE THEM DISTINCTIVE. ISSRAELIAN ADDED THAT US WOULD HAVE THE SAME OPPORTUNITY IF PNE'S ARE PERMITTED UNDER A CTB, SO NEITHER SIDE WOULD HAVE AN ADVANTAGE. SLOSS RESSPONDED THAT A PNE EXCLUSION WOULD LEGITIMIZE ACTIONS SUCH AS THE INDIAN PNE, AND SHOULD BE OF CONCERN TO BOTH THE US AND USSR.

6. CTB AND CW: ISSRAELIAN THOUGHT IT UNLIKELY THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO PRESENT A JOINT DOCUMENT TO CCD DURING THE SUMMER SESSION ON EITHER CTB OR CW, ALTHOUGH THERE MAY BE A BETTER CHANCE WITH REGARD TO CW. HE SAID THAT WE MUST BE ABLE TO PRESENT SOMETHING BEFORE THE START OF THE 1978 CCD SPRING SESSION. SLOSS SAID THAT HE WAS NOT QUITE SO PESSIMISTIC BUT THOUGHT IT USEFUL TO CONSIDER HOW TO DEAL WITH SUCH A CONTINGENCY. HE SAID THAT IF IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO PRESENT A JOINT PROPOSAL ON EITHER ISSUE BEFORE THE END OF THE SUMMER CCD SESSION, THEN PERHAPS IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO CONTINUE WORK AND ANNOUNCE AT THE UNGA THAT JOINT PRINCIPLES ARE READY. ISSRAELIAN THOUGHT THAT IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA TO WORK OUT PRINCIPLES ON CW AND CTB, WHICH MIGHT PERMIT MORE RAPID PROGRESS. HE SAID THAT THIS WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE IF THERE

ARE NO DIFFERENCES "IN PRINCIPLE" IN THE JOINT PRINCIPLES.

7. MDW: WITH RESPECT TO MDW ISSRAELYAN SAID THAT IT COULD NOT BE A SUBSTITUTE FOR CTB AND CW, HOWEVER, IT MAY BE EASIER TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A SPECIFIC MDW MEASURE SUCH AS RADIOLOGICAL WEAPONS. HE SAID THAT THE US MAY BE UNDERESTIMATING THE PUBLIC APPEAL OF THE SOVIET MDW PROPOSAL IN WHICH HE THOUGHT THERE WAS GROWING INTEREST. SLOSS SAID THAT THE PRINCIPLE OF TRYING TO CLOSE OFF NEW MDW DOES HAVE APPEAL, BUT THAT THE US SIDE HAS HAD DIFFICULTY WITH THE QUESTION OF DEFINITION AND THE EXAMPLES WHICH THE SOVIET EXPERTS HAVE PRESENTED. ALSO, THE US DOUBTS THAT A SINGLE TREATY CAN COVER NEW MDW ADEQUATELY. ISSRAELYAN SUGGESTED THAT A REDEFINITION OF MDW MIGHT HELP AND ACKNOWLEDGED THAT SOME, "BUT NOT ALL" OF THE CRITICISM REGARDING THE SOVIET EXAMPLES OF  
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NEW MDW WAS JUSTIFIED.

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CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-07 PM-04 H-01 INR-07 L-03

NASA-01 NEA-10 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01

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8. SEABEDS: ON THE QUESTION OF FURTHER ARMS LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE SEABEDS, SLOSS ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS HAVE ANY

SPECIFIC PROPOSALS IN MIND. ISSRAELIAN SAID NO BUT THAT THE USSR WOULD BE STUDYING THE QUESTION SO AS TO DEVELOP A PROPOSAL. SUCH A PROPOSAL, HOWEVER, PROBABLY WILL NOT BE READY DURING CCD'S SUMMER SESSION. SLOSS SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED, AND ISSRAELIAN INDICATED THERE WOULD BE CONSULTATIONS WITH THE US BEFORE SOVIETS MADE ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS IN CCD.

9. CCD: ISSRAELIAN INDICATED THAT IN RECENT NON-PROLIFERATION TALKS WITH THE FRENCH, IN PARIS DURING MAY AND IN MOSCOW DURING JUNE, FRENCH OFFICIALS HAD SHOWN GREATER INTEREST IN CCD THAN EVER BEFORE. HOWEVER, HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY CONFIRM REPORTS WE HAVE HEARD FROM OTHER SOURCES HERE THAT FRENCH HAVE TOLD SOVIETS THEY WOULD JOIN CCD IF CO-CHAIRMANSHIP WERE ABOLISHED. IF THE FRENCH APPROACH THE US, ISSRAELIAN ASKED, AND SAY THAT THEY WOULD PARTICIPATE IN CCD.

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PARTICIPATE IN CCD IF THE US-SOVIET CO-CHAIRMANSHIP WERE ABOLISHED, WHAT WOULD THE US REPLY? SLOSS STATED THAT THE US WOULD WELCOME FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN CCD, BUT THAT THEY HAVE NEVER INDICATED TO US THAT THE CO-CHAIRMANSHIP IS THE ONLY OBSTACLE. THE US IS NOT RIGID ABOUT CCD'S STRUCTURE, BUT BEFORE AGREEING TO ANY CHANGE WE WOULD WANT TO ENSURE THAT THE RESULT WOULD BE TO STRENGTHEN THE COMMITTEE, AND WE WOULD WANT TO CONSULT WITH THE SOVIET UNION. SLOSS SAID THAT IN THE US VIEW CCD HAS THREE CHARACTERISTICS WHICH IT WILL BE ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVE: ITS LIMITED SIZE; THE CONSENSUS RULE; ITS INDEPENDENCE FROM THE UN. ISSRAELIAN AGREED WITH THESE POINTS AND STATED THAT WITH OR WITHOUT PROGRESS ON ITEMS BEING DISCUSSED IN CCD, DURING THE UNGA'S SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT (MAY-JUNE 1978) THERE WILL BE PRESSURES TO CHANGE THE CCD'S STRUCTURE, AND THAT IT IS IMPORTANT FOR THE US AND USSR TO KEEP IN TOUCH.

10. SPECIAL SESSION AND WDC: ISSRAELIAN SAID SOVIETS SEE SPECIAL UNGA ON DISARMAMENT AS POTENTIAL "ACCELERATOR" FOR DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS, BUT CONSIDER ITS IMPORTANCE LIMITED BECAUSE IT WILL NOT HAVE POWER TO NEGOTIATE AGREEMENTS ON "REAL DISARMAMENT." SOVIETS WERE CONCERNED, HE SAID, THAT SESSION WOULD AMOUNT TO A STAGESHOW, WITH NO SUBSTANTIVE ACCOMPLISHMENT. HE STRONGLY DEFENDED SOVIET POSITION THAT SPECIAL SESSION SHOULD LEAD TO CONVENING OF WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, DENYING THAT THIS WAS PROPAGANDA STANCE DESIGNED TO ISOLATE CHINESE AND EMBARRASS US. ISSRAELIAN INSISTED THAT, IN SOVIET VIEW, WDC IS A NECESSARY FORUM FOR PRAGMATIC DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS PARALLEL TO THOSE OF THE CCD AND OTHER EXISTING FORUMS. HE SAID HE WAS CONVINCED US WOULD COME AROUND TO SOVIET VIEW BY TIME OF THE SPECIAL SESSION. SLOSS REPLIED THAT US DOUBTS ABOUT WDC REMAIN UNALLAYED, NOTING THAT SOVIETS HAD NOT EXPLAINED HOW "NEGOTIATIONS" COULD BE ORGANIZED IN A

GLOBAL CONFERENCE, AND HOW IT WOULD RELATE TO WORK OF CCD.

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11. TLATELOLCO: AT END OF MEETING, ISSRAELYAN AND STASHEVSKY REFERRED TO US SIGNATURE OF PROTOCOL I OF TREATY OF TLATELOLCO, ASKING HOW US INTERPRETED PROTOCOL WITH RESPECT TO "STATIONING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN PUERTO RICO" ("AN OPEN SECRET," SAID STASHEVSKY), US SHIPS WITH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT GUANTANAMO, TRANSIT OF PANAMA CANAL, AND SUBMARINES IN HIGH SEAS OF THE TREATY'S "ZONE OF APPLICATION." SLOSS NOTED THAT RATIFICATION OF PROTOCOL WOULD CLEARLY PROHIBIT STATIONING OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN ANY US TERRITORY IN TREATY ZONE; THAT TRANSIT RIGHTS ARE NOT AFFECTED BY TREATY; AND THAT HIGH SEAS FREEDOMS ARE ALSO UNAFFECTED. NAZARKIN ASKED HOW US WOULD DEFINE "TRANSIT" -- A SHIP VISITING A PORT FOR AN HOUR, A DAY, OR A MONTH? SLOSS REPLIED THAT THIS WOULD BE A SUBJECT FOR A LEGAL OPINION, BUT NOTED THAT RULE OF REASON WOULD SEE A DISTINCTION BETWEEN A BRIEF STOP AND A MONTH-LONG VISIT. ISSRAELYAN DID NOT INDICATE WHETHER SOVIETS WERE RE-EXAMINING THEIR POSITION, THOUGH HIS QUESTION SUGGESTED CONTINUED SOVIET BELIEF THAT TREATY PREJUDICES HIGH SEAS FREEDOMS AND IS DEFICIENT IN NOT PROHIBITING TRANSIT.

12. AT CONCLUSION, ISSRAELYAN EXPRESSED SATISFACTION OVER MEETING, CALLING FOR BOTH SIDES TO KEEP IN CONTACT ON DISARMAMENT PROBLEMS.SORENSEN

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